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INTRODUCTION
On August 18, 2015, a group of hackers named Impact
Team released 37 million records—9.7 gigabytes of data—from
the Toronto-based website Ashley Madison.1  The hackers
† B.A., Colby College, 2014; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2017; Editor, Cornell
Law Review.  I would like to thank my parents, Peter and Kristine, for their
endless love and support.  Additionally, I would like to thank the members of
the Cornell Law Review for their hard work.
1 Bree Fowler, Lawsuits Against Ashley Madison Over Hack Face Tough
Road, AP NEWS ARCHIVE (Aug. 20, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive
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claimed to be motivated by the alleged unscrupulous practices
of Ashley Madison’s parent company, Avid Life Media Inc., such
as false advertising and failing to follow through on a data-
purging procedure for which it charged members a nineteen-
dollar fee.2  The data dump has affected people from all walks
of life, including 15,000 government employees,3 Vice Presi-
dent Joe Biden’s son,4 and individuals who, because of this
data breach, learned that strangers used their e-mail ad-
dresses to create Ashley Madison accounts.5  Former subscrib-
ers to the website have received demands to pay money in the
form of bitcoins as a ransom on their personal information.6
The data breach is likely related to at least two suicides thus
far.7  Lawsuits against Avid Life Media Inc. have commenced,
and more are in the planning stages; some plaintiffs hope to
coordinate class action litigation.8  Despite the understandable
outrage that the website’s members and former members feel,
many lawyers are not optimistic about the chances of recover-
ing damages from Ashley Madison or Avid Life Media Inc.9
.com/2015/Lawsuits_against_Ashley_Madison_over_hack_face_tough_road/id-
2bb8646f7770441f804d8070696f0ade [https://perma.cc/UGD5-GFN6]; Nicole
Perlroth, Hackers Say They Have Released Ashley Madison Files, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
18, 2015, 7:37 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/hackers-say-
they-have-released-ashley-madison-files/?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/J459-49DH];
Daniel Victor, The Ashley Madison Data Dump, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/technology/the-ashley-madison-
data-dump-explained.html [https://perma.cc/EN7D-7YFW].
2 Perlroth, supra note 1. R
3 Cory Bennett, 15,000 Government Emails Revealed in Ashley Madison
Leak, HILL (Aug. 19, 2015, 9:55 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/
251431-ashley-madison-leak-appears-real-includes-thousands-of-government-
emails [https://perma.cc/Y5BU-FDWX]. But see id. (“[T]he site reportedly did not
check the validity of email addresses, and it’s likely that many of the government
email accounts were faked.”).
4 Tal Kopan, Hunter Biden Denies Link to Ashley Madison, CNN (Aug. 25,
2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/25/politics/hunter-biden-
ashley-madison-denial/?iid=ob_article_organicsidebar_expansion&iref=obinsite
[https://perma.cc/L34U-UMD3].
5 See Victor, supra note 1 (reporting that an unmarried woman in New York R
City said that a man in South Africa had created an account using her e-mail
address).
6 Katie Rogers, After Ashley Madison Hack, Police in Toronto Detail a Global
Fallout, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/tech-
nology/after-ashley-madison-hack-police-in-toronto-detail-a-global-fallout.html
[https://perma.cc/5FUW-HYC8].
7 See id.; CNNMoney Staff, The Ashley Madison Hack . . . in 2 Minutes, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 11, 2015, 11:34 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/24/technol-
ogy/ashley-madison-hack-in-2-minutes/ [https://perma.cc/5XSY-43ZT].
8 Fowler, supra note 1; see CNNMoney Staff, supra note 7. R
9 Fowler, supra note 1. R
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This Note will explore the avenues for recovery available to
individuals who lose control of their personal information when
the security of an organization that collects or holds such infor-
mation is compromised.  This Note will begin by tracing the
development of privacy jurisprudence as it specifically relates
to the creation and eventual prominence of the Internet in the
United States.  Next, the piece will discuss the emerging split of
authority surrounding a question of statutory interpretation
presented by the Good Samaritan exception of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996.  Specifically, the issue is whether 47
U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)—a carve-out within the Good Samaritan ex-
ception that withholds immunity for civil liability for intellec-
tual property claims—applies to federal intellectual property
laws only, or to both federal and state intellectual property
laws.  The piece will then conclude that if the Supreme Court
were to resolve this split of authority, it should, and likely
would, hold that § 230(e)(2) withholds immunity from claims
brought under both federal and state intellectual property
laws.  Finally, this Note will present new policy proposals that
Congress and interactive computer service providers (ICSPs)
could pursue in light of that conclusion.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Privacy and the Internet
“The Internet is ‘a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication.’”10  The Internet grew out of
a 1969 military program called “ARPANET,”11 which was de-
signed to allow communication between military units, defense
contractors, and universities engaged in defense research.12
ARPANET provided for redundant channels of communication
in case parts of the network were destroyed in a war.13  While
the ARPANET exists now only in the annals of history, it pro-
vided the model for the civilian networks that today enable
“tens of millions of people to communicate with one another
and to access vast amounts of information from around the
world.”14
10 Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997), (quoting Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 944 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
11 An acronym for the Advanced Research Project Agency Network. Id. at 850
n.3.
12 Id. at 849–50.
13 Id. at 850.
14 Id.
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The Internet has profoundly affected both consumers and
publishers of information.  For consumers, the Internet pro-
vides “both a vast library including millions of readily available
and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods
and services.”15  For publishers,16 the Internet is “a vast plat-
form from which to address and hear from a worldwide audi-
ence of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers.”17
The Internet’s emergence and rapid rise in both popularity
and use18 has presented novel questions of individual privacy
rights.19  The Internet is forcing American privacy jurispru-
dence to evolve with it—a phenomenon that history has rarely
seen occur with such alacrity.20  As one court has noted:
The near instantaneous possibilities for the dissemination of
information by millions of different information providers
around the world to those with access to computers and thus
to the Internet have created ever-increasing opportunities for
the exchange of information and ideas in “cyberspace.”21
This information revolution has also presented unprece-
dented challenges relating to rights of privacy and reputa-
tional rights of individuals, to the control of . . . rumors and
other information that is communicated so quickly that it is
too often unchecked and unverified.  Needless to say, the
15 Id. at 853.
16 “Any person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can
‘publish’ information.  Publishers include government agencies, educational insti-
tutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups, and individuals.” Id.  “The Internet
allows anyone connected to it to disseminate information, statements, gossip, and
so on, to millions of people with a few strokes on a computer keyboard.  Thus
millions of people now have their own electronic printing presses . . . .”  R. Timothy
Muth, Old Doctrines on a New Frontier: Defamation and Jurisdiction in Cyber-
space, WIS. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 10, 11–12.
17 Reno, 521 U.S. at 853.
18 Id. at 850 (“The Internet has experienced extraordinary growth.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
19 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (dis-
cussing how the Internet has given rise to unprecedented legal debates about
privacy and identity protection); Muth, supra note 16, at 13, 56 (discussing how R
the virtual sphere of cyberspace affects traditional concepts of jurisdiction).
20 See, e.g., It’s in the Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 14–15 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1995) (“The rate at which technological developments are growing cou-
pled with the complexity of technology is beyond many laypersons’ ken.  A uni-
form system of managing information technology and computer networks is
needed to cope with the impact of the information age.  It is the responsibility of
the legislature to manage this technology and to change or amend the statutes as
needed.”).
21 “Cyberspace refers to the interaction of people and businesses over com-
puter networks, electronic bulletin boards and commercial online services.  The
largest and most visible manifestation of cyberspace is the Internet . . . .” Muth,
supra note 16, at 11. R
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legal rules that will govern this new medium are just begin-
ning to take shape.22
As both the use and sophistication of the Internet have
increased, so too have the potential risks that Internet users
face with respect to their personal information.23  Citizens in
the United States are aware of these risks—according to a 2016
Pew Research Center Poll, about half of Americans are con-
cerned about the possible misappropriation of their personal
information through the Internet.24  Scholars agree that this
concern is indeed well-founded.25
B. The Rights of Privacy and Publicity
The historical development of the rights of privacy and
publicity long predate the Internet.  Indeed, these legal con-
cepts had a head start of about eighty years when, in 1890,
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued in a law review
article that the common law should recognize a right to pri-
vacy.26  This right to privacy, they said, should protect citizens
against intrusive and embarrassing stories by the press.27
In 1902, the New York Court of Appeals rejected both the
Warren and Brandeis article and a common law right to privacy
22 Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 49; see also Muth, supra note 16, at 13 R
(“Analogies to existing legal doctrines can take the courts only so far as they begin
to develop the law of cyberspace.”).
23 1 RONALD N. WEIKERS, DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW: SECURITY AND PRIVACY
IN THE NETWORKED WORLD § 2:4 (2016).
24 Kenneth Olmstead & Aaron Smith, Americans and Cybersecurity, PEW RES.
CTR. (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/americans-and-
cybersecurity/ [https://perma.cc/3ZKP-3M74] (“This survey finds that a majority
of Americans have directly experienced some form of data theft or fraud, that a
sizeable share of the public thinks that their personal data have become less
secure in recent years, and that many lack confidence in various institutions to
keep their personal data safe from misuse.”).
25 See, e.g., Muth, supra note 16 at 12 (“To say that libel and slander are R
rampant on the Internet would be an understatement.”).
26 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890); see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY § 1:10 (2d ed. 2015); Leah Burrows, To Be Let Alone: Brandeis Foresaw
Privacy Problems, BRANDEISNOW (July 24, 2013), http://www.brandeis.edu/now/
2013/july/privacy.html [https://perma.cc/R5ET-EYSF] (“Brandeis and his law
partner Samuel Warren published ‘The Right to Privacy’ in the Harvard Law
Review in 1890, where it became the first major article to advocate for a legal right
to privacy.”).
27 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra R
note 26, § 1:10; Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. R
L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (“In simplest terms, for Warren and Brandeis the right to
privacy was the right of each individual to protect his or her psychological integ-
rity by exercising control over information which both reflected and affected that
individual’s personality.”).
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in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.28  The Roberson court
held that Abigail Roberson could not recover from the defen-
dant flour company after the flour company used her portrait
in an advertisement without her consent.29  Writing for the
majority, Chief Judge Alton B. Parker invoked the floodgates
rationale:
If [the right to privacy] be incorporated into the body of the
law through the instrumentality of a court of equity, the at-
tempts to logically apply the principle will necessarily result,
not only in a vast amount of litigation, but in litigation bor-
dering upon the absurd, for the right to privacy, once estab-
lished as a legal doctrine, cannot be confined to the restraint
of the publication of a likeness but must necessarily embrace
as well the publication of a word-picture, a comment upon
one’s looks, conduct, domestic relations or habits.30
In 1905, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized a right to
privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.31  The
plaintiff, Paolo Pavesich, sued the New England Mutual Life
Insurance Company for publishing an advertisement that was
comprised of Pavesich’s picture and a testimonial of Pavesich’s
satisfaction with his life insurance policy.32  Pavesich had
neither purchased a New England Mutual Life Insurance policy
nor given permission for the company to use his picture.33  The
Pavesich court implicitly rejected Chief Justice Parker’s flood-
gates argument:
It may be said that to establish a liberty of privacy would
involve in numerous cases the perplexing question to deter-
mine where this liberty ended . . . . This affords no reason for
not recognizing the liberty of privacy, and giving to the person
aggrieved legal redress against the wrongdoer . . . .34
Justice Cobb, writing for the Georgia Supreme Court, rec-
onciled potential conflicts between a right to privacy and the
constitutional rights of free speech and press by admitting that
in certain instances personal privacy would need to yield to the
public need for information.35  Justice Cobb expressed his con-
fidence in the judiciary to properly balance these two compet-
ing interests and noted that in the case at bar, New England
28 See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 544–45 (1902).
29 Id. at 557–58.
30 Id. at 544–45.
31 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70–71 (1905).
32 Id. at 68–69.
33 Id. at 69.
34 Id. at 72.
35 Id. at 72–73; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 1:17 . R
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Mutual Life Insurance’s advertisement was not “an expression
of an idea, a thought, or an opinion, within the meaning of the
constitutional provision which guaranties to a person the right
to publish his sentiments on any subject.”36
Almost fifty years later, in 1953, Judge Jerome Frank of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals coined the phrase “right of
publicity.”37  In Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, a
dispute arose when rival chewing gum companies competed
over contracts with professional baseball players to use the
players’ pictures on chewing gum cards.38  The plaintiff con-
tended that the defendant knowingly induced players—who
had already signed a contract with the plaintiff—to sign a con-
tract with the defendant. Although the plaintiff brought the
case under a theory of tortious interference with a contract,
Judge Frank nevertheless turned to the narrower issue of the
players’ pictures themselves.39  Judge Frank conceived of the
right of publicity when he said, “We think that . . . a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture . . . .  This
right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”40
One year later, in 1954, Professor Melville Nimmer wrote
an article outlining the fundamental elements necessary to a
right of publicity.41  Nimmer first defined publicity values as the
pecuniary value in a person’s name, photograph, or likeness.42
He then explained that the right of publicity is “the right of each
person to control and profit from the publicity values which he
has created or purchased.”43  It is important to note that Pro-
fessor Nimmer argued that the right of publicity should not be
limited to those who have achieved celebrity status; rather,
every individual has a right of publicity, with the caveat that the
value, with respect to damages, may vary depending on the
societal status of the wronged individual.44
Claire Gorman notes, for example, that the biggest obstacle
that private citizens face in asserting right of publicity claims is
demonstrating a pecuniary interest in their identity and eco-
36 Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80.
37 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 1:26. R
38 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
39 Id. at 867–69.
40 Id. at 868.
41 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
203 (1954).
42 Id. at 204.
43 Id. at 216.
44 Id. at 217.
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nomic harm from its misappropriation.45  Although the simple
fact that a defendant misappropriated a person’s identity trig-
gers a presumption of commercial value, this presumption is
limited to situations in which the defendant uses the person’s
identity for commercial benefit.
The Nimmer and Gorman propositions, taken together,
would seem to bar most private citizens from successfully
bringing right of publicity claims in cases where the details of
their identity have been compromised but not used for com-
mercial gain, as in the case of the Ashley Madison victims.
Nevertheless, private citizens may prevail even if the commer-
cial link is tenuous—such as if the misappropriating party
uses the victim’s identity or likeness in a commercial forum
even without expressly identifying the victim.46
Currently, the courts of twenty-one states have recognized
the right of publicity under state common law.47  Additionally,
eleven states have statutes on the books which, despite explic-
itly mentioning only the right of privacy, are worded so as to
embody the principles of the right of publicity. In sum, then,
thirty-two states recognize the right of publicity, either by stat-
ute or under common law.
C. The Communications Decency Act and its Good
Samaritan Provision
Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act
(CDA)48 as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in large
part to “protect minors from exposure to obscene and indecent
material on the Internet.”49  Indeed, the CDA was meant to
modernize protections against “an increasing number of pub-
lished reports of inappropriate uses of telecommunications
technologies to transmit pornography, engage children in inap-
propriate adult contact, terrorize computer network users
45 See Claire E. Gorman, Publicity and Privacy Rights: Evening Out the Playing
Field for Celebrities and Private Citizens in the Modern Game of Mass Media, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1247, 1274 (2004) (acknowledging that the lodestar of the right of
publicity cause of action is the monetary value that society places on the image
and likeness of celebrity figures).
46 Id. at 1256–57; see, e.g., Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp.
2d 288, 292 (D.N.H. 2008) (involving a claim in which a plaintiff alleged biographi-
cal information and a photo reasonably identified her to members of the commu-
nity despite not expressly using her name).
47 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 6:3. R
48 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
49 Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 699
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing legislative history of the CDA).
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through ‘electronic stalking,’ and seize personal information.”50
Although certain portions of the CDA have been struck down as
“unconstitutional limitations on free speech,” § 230 remains
good law.51
Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA states, “No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information provided by another infor-
mation content provider.”52  This Good Samaritan exception
was enacted to combat congressional concern that subjecting
interactive service providers to the same standards of liability
as entities that actually published online content would create
a chilling effect on the development of the Internet based on the
specter of massive tort liability.53  After all, millions of people
use the Internet and interactive service providers could not
screen every posting for potential problems.54  The Good Sa-
maritan exception “sought to prevent lawsuits from shutting
down websites and other services on the Internet.”55  Congress
prioritized free speech interests and sought to combat any chil-
ling effect by immunizing service providers for content pub-
lished by other entities.56
In the CDA, Congress attempted to walk a fine line between
“preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market that pres-
ently exists for the Internet . . . , unfettered by Federal or State
regulation”57 on the one hand, and “ensur[ing] vigorous en-
forcement of . . . criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking
in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of com-
puter”58 on the other.  In walking this line, Congress chose to
distinguish providers of interactive computer services from
other types of information providers.59  Indeed, “[w]hether
50 S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1996).
51 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003).
52 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
53 See Atl. Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 699.
54 Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Faced
with potential liability for each message republished by their services, interactive
computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type
of messages posted.”).
55 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028.
56 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
57 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2012).
58 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (2012).
59 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Congress
decided not to treat providers of interactive computer services like other informa-
tion providers such as newspapers, magazines or television and radio stations, all
of which may be held liable for publishing or distributing obscene or defamatory
material written or prepared by others.”); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31
(“Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of
speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium. . . . Section 230 was enacted,
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wisely or not, [Congress] made the legislative judgment to effec-
tively immunize providers of interactive computer services from
civil liability in tort with respect to material disseminated by
them but created by others.”60  Without the Good Samaritan
exception, ICSPs could be liable for speech published or dis-
tributed on its website, even though a third party was actually
the author of that speech.61
Accordingly, website owners may be exempt from liability
from common law and state statutory privacy claims pursuant
to the Good Samaritan exception.  There is presently a split of
authority as to whether the CDA preempts state law right of
publicity claims asserted against providers of ICSPs.62  The
Ninth Circuit has held that state law claims against owners
and operators of blogs, websites, and other Internet sites or
services are preempted.63  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis has
been criticized as inconsistent with the plain terms of the CDA
in two district court opinions in the First and Second Cir-
cuits.64  While these cases are not binding precedent, they are
likely to provide persuasive authority in courts outside of the
Ninth Circuit.
II
SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
A. Ninth Circuit: Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC
Perfect 10 publishes an adult entertainment magazine
and owns the website perfect10.com.65  Customers pay
Perfect10.com a  membership fee in order to access the site’s
content.  Perfect 10 displays on its site approximately 5,000
images it has created of its models, many of whom have signed
away to Perfect 10 their rights of publicity.66  CWIE is an In-
in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accord-
ingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum. . . . Congress
made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech through the separate
route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other
parties’ potentially injurious messages.”).
60 Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 49.
61 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003).
62 4 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 37.05[5] (2016).
63 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007).
64 Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298
(D.N.H. 2008).
65 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1108.
66 The right of publicity is “the right to prevent others from using one’s name
or picture for commercial purposes without consent.”  Douglass v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985).  The right of publicity can include
a person’s “name, likeness, and other identifying characteristics.”  Michael
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ternet service-provider to website-owners; CCBill enables
credit card or check payment for online memberships or sub-
scriptions to e-commerce venues.67  CWIE and CCBill provided
services to websites that posted images on the Internet from
Perfect 10’s magazine and website.  In  2002, Perfect 10 sued
CWIE and CCBill claiming, inter alia, a violation of right of
publicity under state law as well as false and misleading
advertising.
According to the Ninth Circuit, a majority of federal courts
have read the Good Samaritan clause of the CDA to immunize
service providers  against claims originating from third-party
usage of their service.68  This immunity does not extend, how-
ever, to suits sounding in intellectual property.69  The court
noted that 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2), which exempts intellectual
property claims from Good Samaritan immunity, does not ex-
pressly define “intellectual property.”70  The court reasoned
that because state intellectual property laws differ across the
country, and because information on the Internet can be ac-
cessed in multiple states at the same time, Congress must have
intended to exempt only federal intellectual property claims
from immunity.71  To hold otherwise would be to allow one
state’s intellectual property laws to “dictate the contours of this
federal immunity.”72  Accordingly, the court determined that
CWIE and CCBill are eligible for immunity under the CDA
against Perfect 10’s state law false advertising and right of pub-
licity claims.73
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 130 (1993).  “The majority of commentators and courts hold
that everyone, celebrity and noncelebrity alike, has a right of publicity.”  1 McCar-
thy, supra note 26, § 4:14. R
67 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1108.
68 Id. at 1118.
69 The CDA also states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)
(2012).
70 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118.
71 Id. at 1118–19; see also Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit Opinion in Perfect 10 v.
CCBill, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Mar. 29, 2007), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2007/03/ninth_circuit_o.htm [https://perma.cc/3Q8Q-NAAE] (“In one
brief yet bold stroke, the 9th Circuit . . . say[s] simply that where Congress said
‘[intellectual property],’ they meant ‘federal [intellectual property].’”).
72 Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118.
73 Id. at 1121.
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B. New Hampshire District Court: Doe v. Friendfinder
Network, Inc.
In Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., the plaintiff sued the
adult social network and dating service, Adult FriendFinder,
for, among other things, violation of the plaintiff’s right of pub-
licity under New Hampshire law.74  The plaintiff alleged that a
fake profile was created on the site, and that the biographical
data and nude photo associated with the profile could reasona-
bly identify the plaintiff to members in her community.75  The
plaintiff further alleged that when she requested that the pro-
file be removed from the site, Adult FriendFinder agreed, but
that for several more months the profile continued to exist on
other similar websites that the defendant owned.
The defendant contended that the CDA shielded it from the
plaintiff’s state law claim.76  The plaintiff asserted that the CDA
does not bar her state law claim of violation of her right of
publicity, “which she characterize[d] as an infringement of her
intellectual property rights.”77  The defendant countered that
the CDA does not apply to state-created property rights.
The District Court noted that both the First and Eleventh
Circuits have construed § 230(e)(2) as applying to both federal
and state intellectual property laws.78  The court went on to
address the Ninth Circuit’s contrary statutory interpretation in
Perfect 10, stating, “this court does not find the Ninth Circuit’s
resolution of the statutory interpretation question to be per-
suasive.”79  The District Court reasoned that Congress’s use of
the modifier “any” in § 230(e)(2) suggests that Congress did not
intend to place a limiting construction on intellectual property
law, especially in light of the fact that Congress distinguished
between federal and state law in other provisions of the CDA.80
74 Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008).
75 Id. at 292.
76 Id. at 294.
77 Id. at 298.
78 Id. at 299; see also Martin Samson, Jane Doe v. Friendfinder Network Inc.
and Various, Inc., INTERNET LIBR. L. & CT. DECISIONS, http://www.internetlibrary
.com/cases/lib_case600.cfm [https://perma.cc/PXD8-3PHV] (“In reaching this
result, the Court found more persuasive dicta from the First Circuit in Universal
Comm’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422-23 (1st Cir. 2007) than a
contrary holding of the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CC Bill, LLC, 488 F.3d
1102 (9th Cir.) cert denied 128 S.Ct. 709 (2007), where the Ninth Circuit ‘con-
strue[d] the term “intellectual property” to mean “federal intellectual property.”’”).
79 Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d at 299; see also Goldman,
supra note 71 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit is out-of-bounds here.  Just based on straight R
statutory interpretation, I don’t see how the Ninth Circuit can conclude that the
word ‘federal’ is imported into the words ‘intellectual property.’”).
80 Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
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The court “disagree[d] with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Per-
fect 10 that § 230(e)(2) exempts only federal intellectual prop-
erty laws” and held that “§ 230(e)(2) applies simply to ‘any law
pertaining to intellectual property,’ not just federal law.”81  Ac-
cordingly, the CDA did not shield Adult FriendFinder from the
plaintiff’s state-law right of publicity claim.82
C. New York District Court: Atlantic Recording Corp. v.
Project Playlist, Inc.
In Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., the
plaintiffs were six of the largest record companies and the de-
fendant (“Playlist”) operated a website on which users could
compile playlists of songs available through third-party web-
sites.83  Playlist used a computer program called a “spider” to
locate recordings of songs across the world wide web.84  After
finding a song, users could listen to it, save it to a playlist on
Playlist’s website, or download it.85  In addition, users could
also upload their playlists  to social networking sites such as
Facebook and MySpace.
The plaintiffs owned copyrights to the majority of the songs
that users could access through Playlist and contended that
many of the songs on third-party websites to which Playlist
provided links were posted without plaintiffs’ permission.86  Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiffs sued Playlist for copyright infringement
and unfair competition. The plaintiffs argued that their state
law claims could proceed against Playlist because they fell
within the carve-out to immunity under § 230(e)(2) of the
CDA.87  Playlist countered that § 230(e)(2) withholds immunity
from only federal claims and thus protects Playlist from plain-
tiffs’ New York state-law claims.
81 Id. at 302 (quoting Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409,
413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); see also Samson, supra note 78 (“The Court held that the R
Communications Decency Act did not, however, immunize defendants from intel-
lectual property claims plaintiff advanced, both under applicable federal and state
laws, including right of publicity claims advanced under New Hampshire state
law.  Plaintiff was accordingly allowed to proceed with claims that defendants, by
including identifiable aspects of plaintiff’s persona in advertisements and ‘teasers’
in an effort to increase the profitability of their websites, violated her right to
publicity.”).
82 Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
83 Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 692–93
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
84 Id. at 693.
85 Id. at 694.
86 Id. at 693.
87 Id. at 702.
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United States District Judge Denny Chin held that the
Good Samaritan exception does not provide immunity for ei-
ther federal or state law intellectual property claims.88  In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Chin dealt specifically with the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10.89  First, Judge Chin
stated that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the intellectual prop-
erty carve-out was grounded in policy considerations rather
than textual interpretation.90  Second, he noted that Congress
explicitly specified in four different instances that a particular
subsection of 230(e) was to apply to local, state, or federal
law.91  Accordingly, if Congress had intended to limit the carve-
out to federal law, it knew how to do so.92  Finally, the modifier
“any” in the phrase, “any law pertaining to intellectual prop-
erty” indicates that Congress had no desire to limit the carve-
out in any way.93
III
ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Resolution
The Good Samaritan Provision of the Communications De-
cency Act states, “No provider or user of an interactive com-
puter service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content pro-
vider.”94  This sentence provides immunity to entities such as
Project Playlist, Adult FriendFinder, and Ashley Madison.  Sec-
tion 230(e)(2) of the CDA, however, is a carve-out from the Good
Samaritan Provision that withholds immunity for intellectual
property claims.95  The question that has divided courts, and
the question that the Supreme Court should resolve, is
88 Id. at 704; see also Eric Goldman, 230 Doesn’t Preempt State IP Claims—
Atlantic Records v. Project Playlist, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2009),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/04/230_doesnt_pree.htm [https://
perma.cc/EW36-RK5E] (“The court conducts a very sensible textual analysis of
47 USC 230 to conclude that it preempts neither state nor federal [intellectual
property].  Thus, the net result is that this court, like the N[ew] H[ampshire]
Friendfinder court, votes against the Ninth Circuit’s [Perfect 10] ruling. . . . [T]he
Ninth Circuit’s reading is untenable, in which case either the Ninth Circuit will
have to revise its reading . . . or the circuit split may potentially bubble up to the
Supreme Court.”).
89 The defendants relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Atl. Recording
Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
90 Id. at 703 & n.11.
91 Id. at 703.
92 Id. (“[Congress] knew how to make that clear, but chose not to.”).
93 Id. at 703–04.
94 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
95 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012).
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whether the § 230(e)(2) carve-out applies to (1) all laws pertain-
ing to intellectual property or (2) only federal laws pertaining to
intellectual property.  In the case of the former, the Good Sa-
maritan Provision would not provide immunity for any federal
or state-law intellectual property claims.  According to the lat-
ter, ICSPs would retain immunity against state-law, but not
federal, intellectual property claims.
The current split of authority has placed the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals at odds with the District Courts of New Hamp-
shire and New York.96  In Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit held that
the immunity carve-out applies to only federal laws, thereby
bestowing ICSPs with immunity against state-law intellectual
property claims.97  The court’s analysis, however, was
grounded in policy considerations rather than statutory lan-
guage.98  The court employed the following line of reasoning:
First, each state may have a different statutory scheme regard-
ing intellectual property claims.  Second, the same website on
the Internet can be accessed simultaneously in multiple states.
Third, it follows that to exempt federal and state intellectual
property claims from immunity would be to allow different state
laws to define the contours of this federal immunity.  Finally,
given the preceding proposition, it must be true that Congress
intended to exempt only federal intellectual property claims
from immunity, while leaving ICSPs immune from state-law
claims.
The New Hampshire District Court took the opposite view
in Doe v. Friendfinder.99  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the New
Hampshire District Court analyzed the language of the CDA
and concluded that the immunity carve-out applies to both
federal and state intellectual property claims.100  The court
96 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007); Atl.
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008); see
also Goldman, supra note 88 (“In the surprising 2007 [Perfect 10] opinion, the 9th R
Circuit read [47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)] to mean that [§] 230 does not preempt [federal
intellectual property] claims, but all state [intellectual property] claims were pre-
empted.  Then, in the 2008 Friendfinder case, a New Hampshire district court
expressly declined to follow the [Perfect 10] opinion, concluding that state public-
ity rights claims weren’t preempted by [§] 230.”).
97 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 2007).
98 See id. at 1118–19.
99 See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H.
2008).
100 Id. at 299–302; see also Goldman, supra note 88 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s R
statutory analysis in [Perfect 10] was daft, so I am not surprised to find another
court expressly rejecting it.  (In fact, I doubt any court outside the Ninth Circuit
will follow the [Perfect 10] case).”).
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noted that the modifier “any” in § 230(e)(2)’s phrase “[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property” does not place a limiting
instruction on intellectual property law.101
The court argued that this is especially true given that
Congress distinguished between federal and state law else-
where in the CDA.102  Therefore, the court held that the immu-
nity carve-out withholds immunity from both federal and state
law intellectual property claims.103
In Project Playlist, the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York arrived at the same conclusion as the New
Hampshire District Court.104  Judge Chin focused on the same
statutory construction issues as the Friendfinder court, noting
the significance of the modifier “any” in § 230(e)(2) and also
stating that Congress knew how to limit the immunity carve-
out to federal law if it so desired.105
If the Supreme Court resolves this split of authority, it
should hold that the immunity carve-out applies to claims
under both federal and state laws pertaining to intellectual
property.  The New Hampshire and New York District Court
opinions are more persuasive than the Ninth Circuit’s because
the District Courts build their conclusion on the foundation of
the actual statutory language.
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is not illogical; indeed, it
comports with Congress’s “legislative judgment to effectively
immunize providers of interactive computer services from civil
liability in tort with respect to material disseminated by them
but created by others”106 by extending that immunity to state-
law intellectual property claims.  Nevertheless, it is not a
court’s place to carry out what it perceives to be Congress’s
will.  Legislators are sophisticated actors who are both able and
expected to promulgate laws that accurately represent the leg-
islative branch’s intentions.
Accordingly, the plain text of the statutory provision in
question should govern any type of interpretive analysis aimed
at discerning Congress’s legislative intent.  That the
Friendfinder and Project Playlist courts grounded their analyses
in the language of § 230(e)(2) is the reason that their reasoning
101 See Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
102 Id. at 301.
103 Id. at 302.
104 See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
105 Id. at 703.
106 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).
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and conclusions are more persuasive than those of the Perfect
10 court.  The Supreme Court, therefore, should decide that
ICSPs are not immune from federal or state-law intellectual
property claims because § 230(e)(2) carves those claims out of
the Good Samaritan Provision of the CDA.
A holding that § 230(e)(2) applies to both federal and state
intellectual property laws will not create a chilling effect on
Internet activity or allow state laws to determine the contours
of the Good Samaritan immunity as the Ninth Circuit fears
because the intellectual property exception is one small carve-
out of an otherwise far-reaching immunity for ICSPs.  Intellec-
tual property abuses are just one of the many kinds of harmful
activities that the millions of Internet users may engage in,
including harassment and distributing obscene or defamatory
material.  Allowing ICSPs to be liable for intellectual property
abuses will not contradict Congress’s policy decision “not to
deter harmful online speech through the separate route of im-
posing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries
for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.”107
B. Policy Proposals
Assuming that ICSPs do not have immunity from claims
brought under state and federal intellectual property laws,
what does that mean for victims of intellectual property based
abuses?  Because right of publicity claims fall under intellec-
tual property—as noted in Doe v. Friendfinder—victims can sue
the ICSP for the violation of the right of publicity by third par-
ties.  This, in turn, shifts the incentive to the ICSPs to deter-
mine how to best police against and combat intellectual
property abuses on their websites.
1. Information Transfer
One way that ICSPs can protect themselves against law-
suits is to present the injured party with the identity of the
actual wrongdoer, i.e., the third party that wrongly dissemi-
nated information.  If Congress’s justification for the broad im-
munity of the CDA is that it is too difficult to hold companies
liable for their members’ posts and that such an imposition of
liability will chill speech, then companies should at least be
obliged to provide the victim of the data breach with details
about the individual who posted the information.  In doing so,
ICSPs could deflect the injured party’s claim back against the
107 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
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actual wrongdoer.  To effect this change, Congress could pass
an amendment to the CDA requiring breached companies to
relinquish any information that they discover about the iden-
tity of the hacker to the victims of the data breach.  Accord-
ingly, the victims would most likely direct the resulting lawsuit
against the culpable party rather than against the ICSP.
Unfortunately, this proposed solution has a two-pronged
defect.  First, due to the fact that many security breaches of
this kind are criminal activities performed by cyber hackers, it
will be difficult for the breached company or entity to discover
any meaningful information relating to the identity of the per-
petrators.  For example, when the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment was hacked in 2015, hackers stole the Social Security
numbers of approximately 21.5 million government workers.108
However, even after this massive security breach, then Director
of National Intelligence, James Clapper, stated only that China
was the “leading suspect” in the cyber attack.109  As another
example, the most that is known about the Ashley Madison
hackers is that the name of the group that orchestrated the
cyber attack is Impact Team—investigators do not know any-
thing more than this mysterious Internet calling card.110
Second, even if the breached company or law enforcement
officers do discover the identity of the person or persons re-
sponsible for illegally disseminating victims’ personal informa-
tion, it may prove impossible to prosecute due to international
law or relations.  For example, if the Chinese government
orchestrated the breach of the Office of Personnel Management
in 2015, then even if the United States discovered the identities
of the hackers responsible, we would almost certainly not be
able to arrange for their transportation to America to stand
trial.
Take, as another example, Edward Snowden.  Snowden
was a contractor at the National Security Agency who, in June
of 2013, leaked troves of information regarding American in-
ternet and phone surveillance techniques to the media.111  Af-
108 Cybersecurity Resource Center: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. OFF. PER-
SONNEL MGMT, https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/
W3DT-S52P].
109 Jim Sciutto, OPM Government Data Breach Impacted 21.5 Million, CNN
(July 10, 2015, 1:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/09/politics/office-of-
personnel-management-data-breach-20-million/ [https://perma.cc/4RHL-
V87M].
110 Perlroth, supra note 1. R
111 See Edward Snowden: Leaks That Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC (Jan.
17, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964 [https://per
ma.cc/F3LN-8JCP].
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ter he divulged the information, Snowden fled the United States
and has since been granted asylum in Russia, out of the reach
of the U.S. justice system.112  The recent vote by the European
parliament—composed of members from all twenty-eight Euro-
pean Union states—that called on member states to drop any
criminal charges against Snowden and prevent his extradition
to the United States means that he will likely be able to con-
tinue to evade prosecution for his crimes. Despite these exam-
ples, it is nonetheless possible—however unlikely—that victims
of the Ashley Madison breach could sue the perpetrators.
Ashley Madison is a Toronto-based company, and if it is discov-
ered that the hackers are also Canadian, the United States
would be able to rely on its extradition treaty with Canada to
bring the hackers back to the United States to stand trial.113
That path is far from certain, however, considering that the
hackers’ identities are currently unknown.
2. Narrow the Intellectual Property Carve-Out
A different approach that Congress could take in response
to the proposition that ICSPs are not immune from either fed-
eral or state right of publicity claims is to amend the CDA to
narrow the § 230(e)(2) intellectual property carve-out.  In other
words, Congress could legislate that claims advanced under
the right of publicity do not fall under the umbrella of intellec-
tual property claims.  This solution would be beneficial because
it would save time and judicial resources.  Given the difficulty
that private citizens face in recovering under the right of pub-
licity,114 there might be a net benefit from immunizing ICSPs
from such claims and removing them from the judicial process.
After all, the fact that private citizens may sue ICSPs does not
seem to be serving as an incentive for ICSPs to undertake
greater security measures—at least in the case of Ashley
Madison.115
112 See Tom McCarthy, Edward Snowden Praises EU Parliament Vote Against
US Extradition, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/oct/29/edward-snowden-eu-parliament-vote-extradition [https://
perma.cc/QXQ9-QKW6].
113 See Treaty on Extradition Between Canada and the United States of
America, Can.-U.S., Dec. 3, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 983, https://www.oas.org/juridico/
MLA/en/traites/en_traites_can-usa-ext1991.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z4F-
KTSM].
114 See Nimmer, supra note 41, at 204; Gorman, supra note 45, at 1274. R
115 Ashley Madison failed to perform the data-scrub that it offered members
for a nineteen-dollar fee as a way to completely eliminate any records of the
member’s registration with the site. See Perlroth, supra note 1. R
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Accordingly, granting this immunity would be a method for
Congress to further refine its process of balancing vibrant free
speech interests with the need to protect minors from obscene
material on the internet.116  Indeed, this policy proposal would
further Congress’s intention “not to deter harmful online
speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on
companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ poten-
tially injurious messages.”117  Finally, this would only affect the
subset of claims advanced under the right of publicity, while
leaving untouched § 230(e)(2)’s allowance of liability for other
types intellectual property claims.  Because rights of publicity
claims are purely personal, immunizing ICSPs from them
would not have the same effect as immunizing ICSPs from, say,
claims relating to research and development, new product de-
signs, or other proprietary information.  These commercial in-
tellectual property claims should continue to be allowed as a
way of ensuring good business practices.  Right of publicity
claims arising out of cybersecurity breaches play no such func-
tional role in society.
However, immunizing ICSPs from right of publicity causes
of action, despite uncluttering the judicial system, may never-
theless prove to be unsatisfactory.  Even if this potential liabil-
ity is not currently creating a significant incentive for ICSPs to
engage in protective measures concerning consumer informa-
tion, and even if claimants face substantial barriers to recov-
ery, to eliminate the right of publicity cause of action would be
to begin down a slippery slope.  Although improving judicial
efficiency is certainly a worthy endeavor, it should not be the
basis for casting aside an otherwise legitimate cause of action.
Similarly, the fact that private citizens may rarely recover does
not mean that Congress should deprive them of the opportu-
nity to vindicate their rights when an ICSP’s security is
breached.
3. Data-Breach Insurance
A final policy proposal is that insurance companies could
create a new type of insurance policy specifically designed for
ICSPs in the event that a cybersecurity attack occurs.  This
would be helpful because—were the Supreme Court to resolve
the § 230(e)(2) split of authority by determining that ICSPs are
not immune from state or federal law right of publicity claims—
the price that ICSPs charge for their services might increase
116 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(2), (5) (2012).
117 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
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dramatically.  A price increase passed on to consumers would
have precisely the chilling effect that Congress attempted to
avoid in passing the CDA118 and would also have the potential
to decrease demand for services to the point that some ICSPs
might go out of business—another result that Congress sought
to avoid.119
“Third-Party Data Breach” insurance would be similar to
director and officer insurance in the corporate context in that it
would transform a potentially massive source of liability into a
manageable risk that would be assimilated into the everyday
costs of doing business.  If a cyber attack breached an ICSP’s
security and accessed important consumer information, then
the Third-Party Data Breach insurance would allow the victims
to be compensated for the violation of their right of publicity.
Additionally, ICSPs could avoid lawsuits and thereby save the
legal fees of defending against right of publicity claims.
It is unclear whether a Supreme Court decision withhold-
ing immunity for state and federal intellectual property claims
would indeed cause a large price increase for ICSP services.
ICSPs might not consider right of publicity claims especially
threatening given the difficulties private citizens have faced in
succeeding on such claims mentioned above.  Nevertheless, it
is entirely possible that at least some ICSPs would raise their
prices as a way to insulate their business against potential
lawsuits.  That, coupled with the fact that there is no downside
to the creation of Third-Party Data Breach insurance policies,
leads to the conclusion that this policy proposal is the best and
most efficient way to respond if the Supreme Court resolves the
split of authority in favor of the New York and New Hampshire
District Courts.
CONCLUSION
A. Resolution of the § 230(e)(2) Intellectual Property
Carve-Out
The Supreme Court should resolve this split of authority in
order to settle the matter of whether ICSPs are immune from
state and federal right of publicity claims.  The analysis of the
New York and New Hampshire District Courts was grounded in
the plain language of § 230120 and is thus more persuasive
118 See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 700
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
119 See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).
120 See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299, 301
(D.N.H. 2008) (noting first that Congress used the modifier “any” when referring to
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than the Ninth Circuit’s decision which relied exclusively on
policy considerations.121  Accordingly, the Supreme Court
should follow the District Court opinions in Doe v.
Friendfinder122 and Atlantic Records v. Project Playlist.123
B. Moving Forward
Assuming that the Supreme Court holds that § 230(e)(2)
applies to both federal and state intellectual property laws,
then the victims of the Impact Team’s hack of Ashley Madison
could, theoretically, sue Ashley Madison.  However, because
the hackers have yet to use the victims’ information for any
type of commercial purpose—the hackers merely made the in-
formation available to the public—the victims would likely be
unable to show any recoverable monetary value.  Therefore, a
favorable ruling on the split of authority would help the Ashley
Madison victims in theory, but not in practice.  Those former
members of Ashley Madison that paid the nineteen-dollar fee to
have their profiles permanently deleted could very likely still
succeed under contract principles, though again, harm and
damages would likely be nominal.
The best societal response to the Supreme Court holding
that ICSPs are immune from claims advanced under both state
and federal intellectual property laws is the creation of Third-
Party Data Breach insurance policies.  Requiring breached
companies to transfer information about the hackers to victims
of the breach will likely yield little benefit; even in the unlikely
case that an investigation uncovers the identity of the hackers,
prosecution will still be difficult and costly.  Additionally, nar-
rowing the intellectual property carve-out to exclude claims
based on the right of publicity would forsake a legitimate cause
of action in the interests of judicial efficiency—an unbalanced
tradeoff that society should avoid in this instance (and gener-
ally).  Third-Party Data Breach insurance provides the greatest
benefit—allowing companies to compensate victims of cyber-
security attacks for an affordable cost—with no significant
drawback.  Therefore, the best policy response to potential lia-
bility for right of publicity claims does not lie in Congress’s
intellectual property laws, which signaled that the statute included both federal
and state intellectual property law; and, second, that Congress knew how to
distinguish between federal and state laws if it chose to do so); Atl. Recording
Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (reaching the same conclusion).
121 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007).
122 Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
123 Atl. Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 703.
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hands, but in the hands of the private sector insurance
industry.
